Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development
Volume 6, 1990, Issue 1

Article 3

Unjust Elections of State Judges Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act: League of United Latin American Citizens Council No.
4434 v. Clements
Eileen Campbell
Robert R. Viducich

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

UNJUST ELECTIONS OF STATE
JUDGES UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: LEAGUE OF
UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS
COUNCIL NO. 4434 v. CLEMENTS
In 1870, Congress enacted the fifteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution to guarantee all citizens the right to
vote irrespective of their race or color.' Nevertheless, voting
rights discrimination continued to affect the nation.' In response,
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ["VRA"] in an

effort to secure minorities' right of equal access to the electoral
process.' Section 2 of the VRA prohibits a state from implementUS. CONSr. amend. XV, § I. Section one of the fifteenth amendment provides: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id.
Section two of the fifteenth amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. Cowsr. amend. XV, §2. See City of Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 n.10 (1980); United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh v.
Carey, Governor of New York, 430 U.S. 144, 155 n.16 (1977); Solomon v. Liberty County,
865 F.2d 1566, 1583 (11th Cir. 1988), vacated, 873 F.2d 248 (11 th Cir. 1989).
* See Copeland, The Status of Minority Voting Rights: A Look at Section V PreclearanceProtections and Recent Decisions Affecting Multi-member Voting Districts, 28 How. L.J. 417, 417-20
(1985) (detailing methods of disenfranchising black voters after passage of fifteenth amendment); Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAID. L Rzv. 523, 523-50
(1973) (noting disenfranchisement of blacks since passage of fifteenth amendment). Cf.
Note, State JudicialElections and the Voting Rights Act: Will Section 2 Protect Minority Voters?,
23 GA. L. REV. 787, 787 (1989) [hereinafter "Note, State Judicial Elections"] ("While over
one hundred years have elapsed since the fifteenth amendment [was enacted] ... a number
of election systems and practices persist that effectively dilute the impact of votes cast by
minorities.").
' Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 US.C. § 1971, 1973-1973ff-6 (1982 & Supp. V). The
Voting Rights Act was passed pursuant to Section two of the fifteenth amendment, which
empowered Congress to "enforce this article [fifteenth amendment] by appropriate legislation." US. CONs'r. amend. XV, § 2. See Solomon, 865 F.2d at 1569 (describing Section 2 as
"essentially a codification of fifteenth amendment"). See also Derfner, supra note 2, at 550.
Derfner described the VRA as, "a comprehensive scheme for regulating the details of certain states' election process both as to registration and voting .... " Id.
' See Derfner, supra note 2, at 550 (VRA of 1965 enacted in attempt to enforce fifteenth
amendment through stringent measures); McKenzie & Krauss, Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act: An Analysis of the 1982 Amendment, 19 HAlv. C.R.-C.L L REv. 155, 155 (1984) (Con-
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ing any voting procedures which, based on race or color, abridge
one's right to vote.' In furtherance thereof, Section 2 includes a
"results" test which recognizes a violation based on the "totality
gress passed VRA in 1965 "to root out the blight of voting discrimination and to affirm the
fundamental right of each citizen to participate fully in elections"). See also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 546 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (VRA "addressed the problem
of denial of access to the electoral process"); Collins v. City of Norfolk, Va., 883 F.2d
1232, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (VRA's "purpose of securing equal opportunity for minorities
to 'elect the representatives of their choice' "). United States v. Marengo County Comm'n,
731 F.2d 1546, 1556 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984). The court noted that
"[tihe goal of the [VRA] has always been to ensure an effective right of participation ....
The statute is violated if a protected class has 'less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.'" Id. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14, at 336-40
(1978) (providing brief history of Voting Rights Act of 1965).
& See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act in direct response to the Supreme Court's interpretation of that section in City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.)
(party need not prove intent after Bolden), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), overruled,
League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex.,
111 S. Ct. 775 (1991). In Bolden, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 2 as requiring
plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent before establishing a violation. Bolden, 446 U.S. at
62. Disagreeing with this interpretation, Congress amended the VRA in 1982 by inserting
a "results test" to Section 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act now provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, that nothing
in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id. See generally Blacksher, Drawing Single-Member Districts to Comply with the Voting Rights
Amendments of 1982, 17 URB. LAW. 347 (1985) (in-depth analysis of Section 2's statutory
language and legislative history); Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. RLV. 633
(1983) (same); McKenzie & Krauss, supra note 4 (same).
I See VRA of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1965). The "results test" provides, in subsection
(a), that:
[njo voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color.
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of the circumstances." ' While the validity of the VRA has not
been questioned, federal courts have disagreed as to whether Section 2 applies to state judicial elections. 8 Recently, in League of
Id.
This results test eases plaintiff's burden of proof by merely requiring proof of discriminatory results of legislative districting rather than proof of legislative intent to discriminate
among voters, the pre-amendment test. See VRA of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965), amended
by 42 US.C. § 1973c (1982). The intent test which existed under the original Section 2
provided that "[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color
.. I
ld. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (results test does not place
;'inordinately difficult' burden of proof on plaintiffs," as did intent test); Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613, 621-22 (1982) (proof of discriminatory intent no longer essential to vote
dilution claim), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 899 (1982); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 279
(6th Cir. 1988) ("[ilt is clearly a less onerous task to prove a violation on the basis of a head
count than to be required to show discriminatory intent or purpose"); United States v.
Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1564 (11 th Cir.) ("discriminatory intent need
not be shown to establish a violation"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984); McCrary, Discriminatas, Intent: The Continuing Relevance of "Purpose" Evidence in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28
How. L. J. 463, 464 (1985) (old intent standard required greater "investment of time, energy and money" than new results test); A. Miller & M. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the
VRA: What isthe Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMOiY L. REv. 1, 3 (1988) (plaintiff's burden
of proof "lightened" under "results" test); Note, State Judicial Elections, supra note 2, at
788 (results standard is easier for plaintiffs to meet than intent test).
Congress amended Section 2 to add the less burdensome "results" test after the Supreme Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), ruled that plaintiffs must allege
and prove deliberate discriminatory acts by state officials. See Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d
1056, 1059 (5th Cir.) (no need to prove intent after Bolden), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955
(1988), overruled, League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nomn. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991). S.REP. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15,
reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 192 ("[Almendment to Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act is designed to restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden."); Comment, Vote Dilution, DiscriminatoryResults, and ProportionalRepresentation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for
a Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. Rv. 1203, 1205 (1985) (by
adding results test, Congress wanted to return to pre-Bolden effects standard).
' See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973) (Congress adopted Court's application
of "totality of the circumstances" concept); S. REP.No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 206-07 (ist of relevant factors
which create totality of circumstances). See also Jones v. City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233,
234 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., special concurrence) (whether district is "racially
polarized" is "key" factor in totality of circumstances review); Engstrom, The Reincarnation
of the Intent Standard: Federal Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28 How. L.J. 495, 499
(1985) (among typical circumstances which establish vote dilution claim, most relevant is
whether district is "racially polarized").
I Compare League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914
F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (Section 2 does not apply to state court judges), cert. granted sub
nona.
Houston Lawyer's Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 11 S.Ct. 775 (1991) with Chisom
v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.) (Section 2 does cover state judicial elections), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin American Citizens Council
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United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements ["LULAC"]," the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
overruled a two year-old precedent and concluded that Section 2
does not apply to such elections.10
In LULAC, minority voters brought suit against the Texas Attorney General, challenging the at-large election of state court
judges as being violative of Section 2 of the VRA. Seeking to
prevent dilution of their voting strength, plaintiffs argued that the
court should replace the county-wide, at-large voting system with
single-member" elections.1 3 The majority, however, determined
that judges are not "representatives" within the meaning of Section 2,14 and thus, that the VRA did not apply."' The court, sitnot covting en banc, concluded that state judicial elections are
11 and denied the plaintiffs any relief.17
ered by the VRA
This Comment contends that the LULAC court erred in holding
that Section 2 of the VRA does not apply to state judicial elections. It is submitted that state court judges are "representatives"
under the VRA and that they do not hold "single-member" offices. Part I of this Comment will present LULAC's majority, concurring and dissenting opinions. Part II presents a statutory interpretation of "representative" within the meaning of Section 2 in
order to show that the majority's construction of this term was
flawed. Finally, Part III of this Comment will compare and conNo. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub no= Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., I I I S. Ct. 775 (1991) and Mallory v. Eyrich, 839
F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
9 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub non. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., III S. Ct. 775 (1991).
' See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 631.
" See id. at 623. See generally, Note, supra note 11, at 144 n.1. ("Under at-large voting,
all voters in a district may cast a single vote for each open seat in a given election.").
12 See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 631.
18 See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 631.
:4 See id. at 625-27.
' See id. at 628.
' See id. at 623.
17 See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 631. The LULAC court also overturned the two year-old Fifth
Circuit precedent, Chison v. Edwards, which held that Section 2 applied to state court
judges. Id. See also Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955
(1988), overruled, League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub non. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991).
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trast the concurring and dissenting opinions to show that the concurrence erred in concluding that Section 2 does not apply, notwithstanding its acknowledgement that judges are
"representatives" under Section 2.
I.

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS COUNCIL

No. 4434 v.

CLEMENTS

A. The Majority Opinion
Section 2 of the VRA abolishes any voting standard, practice or
procedure which denies or hinders a minority voter's right to
elect "representatives" of his choice.18 Accordingly, the meaning
of the word "representatives" was the significant issue for the LULAC majority.' 9 Disregarding previous judicial findings on this isSee Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). The United States Attorney
General or an "aggrieved person" may initiate a proceeding alleging a violation of Section
2 in a federal district court, where a three-judge court decides if Section 2 applies and if
the election standard should be abolished. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982). The losing party may
appeal to the United States Supreme Court as a matter of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988);
42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982).
In a Supreme Court case factually similar to LULAC, the standard of judicial review of
such voter dilution claims under Section 2 was established. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 48-49 (1986). In Thornburg, black voters challenged legislative redistricting by
arguing that they were unable to elect representatives of their choice. Id. at 30. In reviewing plaintiffs' claims, the Court examined the "totality of the circumstances" and the "impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities 'on the basis
of objective factors.' " Id. at 43-44. Significant factors which the Court considered included, inter a/ia, whether the minority voters could compose a majority in a single-member district, whether the minority group is "politically cohesive," whether racial bloc voting exists, and whether the majority's consistent victories at the polls evidence unfair
districting, such as racial gerrymandering. Id. at 50-51. See geerally S. Rx'. No. 97-417,
97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28-30, reprntedin 1982 US. CoDz CoNG. & ADmiN. Nzws 177, 206-07
(enumerated list of evidentiary factors which plaintiffs should show to establish violation of
Section 2).
11 See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 622. The court defended its limited coverage of the "representatives" issue to the exclusion of many other issues by saying, "[d]im or no, it is the only
light available to guide our footsteps, and we have followed it as best we could." Id. at 631
n.15.
The concurrence rejected the majority's emphasis on the "representatives" issue and
expanded on other issues to conclude as the majority did. Id. at 636 (Higginbotham, J..
concurring). See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (in-depth discussion of concurrence). The dissent determined that the majority focused mainly on the "representatives"
issue because all other issues did not support the majority and because the majority wanted
to apply policy rather than uncover congressional intent. See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 654
(Johnson, J., dissenting). See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (in-depth discussion
of dissent).
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sue,20 the circuit court ruled that "representatives" had an unequivocal meaning.21 Specifically, the court deemed "representatives" to be those officials who subscribe to the views of
their constituents in the performance of their offices.22
The majority arrived at this definition by relying on Section 2's
"precise language"23 and by considering the legislative background of the VRA. 4 In particular, the court was persuaded by
the fact that, at the time Congress amended Section 2, "judicial
officials had never been viewed by any court as representative
ones."' 5 Relying on this omission, the majority proceeded to examine the nature of a judicial office, concluding that judges are
not representatives since the performance of their job is not to be
influenced by the voting public.' Thus, the court construed
the
7
officials.2
executive
and
legislators
only
term to include
B.

The Concurring Opinion

In concurrence, Judge Higginbotham conceded that Section 2
covers judicial elections in general, but not elections for trial/district judges in particular .' The concurrence predicated this consoSee, e.g., Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 278 (6th Cir. 1988) ("representatives" can
be either broadly or narrowly defined); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 517 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (term "representatives" can be applied in
restrictive or broad sense); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1200 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (for
Section 2 purposes, "representatives" used differently than in other contexts); Haith v.
Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (distinct meanings of "representatives"
used in various cases), aofd om., 477 U.S. 901 (1986). Cf. League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1988) (term "representatives" has different levels of meaning), rev'd, League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cart. granted sub nem.
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S.Ct. 775 (1991).
"1 See LULAC ,914 F.2d at 627-29. But comspare LULAC, 914 F.2d at 623 ("every federal

court which had considered the question had concluded that state judges were not 'representatives' ") with LULAC, 914 F.2d at 626 n.9 ("a few courts have held that the use of the
term 'representatives' in Section 2 does not necessarily exclude judges").
" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 622.
" See id. at 624.

sSee id. at 624-25, 628 (VRA's statutory background analyzed).
Id. at 622.
sSee LULAC, 914 F.2d. at 625-27.
sSee id. at 623. The court reasoned that the opinion of the public is not indicative of
the judge's decision and, in fact, that the judge's role is to ignore public opinion rather
than "represent or carry it out." Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
s See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 646-48 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). In Texas, district
judges act as trial judges. See generally Tzx. CoNsTr. art. V,§ 8 (matters where district courts
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clusion on two beliefs: first, that the VRA's purpose was to guarantee minorities the right to have "their interests ...

represented

in governmental decisions; "2 and second, that since Texas trial
judges exercise full and exclusive authority over their office, they
each hold "single-member" offices.8 0 Relying on these two beliefs,
the concurrence, in effect, concluded that applying Section 2 to
judicial elections would not further the VRA's1 purpose, as minorities would not benefit from such application.3
Moreover, the concurrence suggested that minorities would 8be2
better off if Section 2 was not applied to judicial elections.
Under the current election system in Texas, minorities have a
vote on, and thereby influence, all of the candidate judges running in their respective districts."" But under the subdistricting
scheme sought by the plaintiffs in LULAC, voters could elect, and
thereby influence, only those candidates running in their particular subdistrict." Lastly, the concurrence noted that applying Section 2 in this case would defy Texas' desire to link a court's jurisdiction with its electoral base, since a judge elected by only one
subdistrict would be interpreting law for the whole district, effectively giving that judge jurisdiction over members of outside
districts.3
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

In dissent, Judge Johnson referred to Judge Higginbotham's
concurring opinion as "not only wrong" but "dangerous.""' Spehave original jurisdiction); LYNDON B. JOHNSON Saloo. OF PUBLIC AfFAMIS. THE UNIvEsrry
or TEXAS AT AusTIr, Gumz TO TEXAS STATE AGEiaEs 287 (1978) ("The district courts
constitute the chief trial courts in the Texas judicial system.").
I LULAC, 914 F.2d at 651 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Specifically, the concurrence
stated that, "the right secured to minorities under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
not have their vote diluted is expressed in the assertion that their interests are to be represented in governmental decisions." Id.
' See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 648 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
s2See id. at 649, 651 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
2 See id.
at 649, 650 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
" See id.at 650 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 650 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
" See id.at 651 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
" Id. at 652 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson elaborated:
Judge Higginbotham's concurring opinion ("the concurrence") is scarcely removed
from the majority opinion. Like the majority opinion, the concurrence is wholly in-
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cifically, the dissent characterized the concurrence as a "creative
interpretation" of the VRA which "per se" excludes "the greatest
part of the judiciary-state district court judges" - from the Act's
coverage. 7 The dissent suggested that the concurrence failed to
understand the VRA's true purpose." In addition, it pointed out
that the concurrence, after conceding that judges are "representatives," unjustifiably shifted its attention from the "one casting the
vote to the one for whom the vote is cast" by focusing on the
particular office for election.8 ' In the process, the concurrence
was deemed to have worsened matters by erroneously concluding
that Texas' trial judges hold single-member offices, misapprehending the term's true meaning.' 0
II.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF "REPRESENTATIVE"

UNDER

SECTION 2

It is submitted that, notwithstanding its selective consideration

of Section 2's legislative background, the majority, in effect, engaged in an inappropriate and erroneous "plain meaning" interpretation of the term "representative." First, a plain meaning interpretation was inappropriate because the term "representative"
is not plain at all, but ambiguous, as conflicting court interpretations indicate. " Thus, consistent with fundamental rules of statutory construction, "' the court should have considered the VRA's
consistent with the reasoned decisions of numerous courts and the established position of the Attorney General. The concurrence purports to rely upon compelling
precedent from another federal court. But in truth, the concurrence is entirely premised upon a single case that is not authority for the concurring opinion's eccentric
holding. The scar the concurrence would leave on the Voting Rights Act is no less
injurious than that the majority inflicts ....
Id.
Id. at 655 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
See id.at 658 (Johnson. J.. dissenting).
LULAC, 914 F.2d at 656 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
* See id.at 657 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
" See supra note 20 (setting forth cases in which courts found inconsistent definitions of
term "representative").
" See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("[w]hen
aid to construction of the meaning of words... is available, there certainly can be no 'rule
of law' which forbids its use"); Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934)
(where plain meaning of Act is insufficient to reveal legislative intent, legislative history
must be reviewed); Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) (where evidence of legislative intent exists and plain meaning yields unreasonable results, Act is to be construed in
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legislative history more extensively instead of dismissing significant pieces of legislative intent as "bird shot contentions.""' Second, even assuming, arguendo, that a mere plain meaning interpretation was appropriate, the majority's interpretation was
erroneous, as it dismissed significant points of statutory construction4 4 and, consequently, arrived at a distorted interpretation of
the meaning of "representative."' Accordingly, it is further submitted that even a plain meaning interpretation should not have
led the majority
to conclude that judges are not "rep6
resentatives."'
A.

Legislative History of Section 2

Examining Section 2's legislative history, Congress' failure to
expressly exclude judicial elections serves as highly persuasive evidence that it did, indeed, intend to incorporate state judicial elections into Section 2."1 Furthermore, indirect support for including
accordance with legislative policy); Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1,17-18 (1904)
(intention of legislature "governs" in statutory interpretation).
The LULAC court circumvented review of the legislative history by claiming "representatives" was unambiguous in meaning and, therefore, resort to legislative history was unnecessary. See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 631. Yet, even when the meaning of statutory language is
plain, courts must review the legislative history of the statute. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) (when evidence of legislative intent exists, court must give it
effect); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 151 (1960) (to reveal congressional intent,
court first looks at statutory language and then to other pertinent materials); Boston Sand
& Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (although statutory language is plain,
court should review other evidence of legislative intent in order to clarify meaning of statute). But see Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 399400 (1966) (most persuasive
evidence of legislative intent is plain meaning of statute, and other materials of legislative
intent are only sometimes to be reviewed); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357 (1956) ("We
must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the consequences"); Ex Parte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (when statutory language is clear, do not refer to legislative
history); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 49Q (1917) (when meaning of statute is
plain, do not consider legislative intent).
" LULAC, 914 F.2d at 630.
" See id. at 629-30. The court dismissed the plaintiff's countervailing points of statutory
construction as "attenuated and derivative in nature" and as "bird shot contentions." Id.
" See infra note 80 and accompanying text (court equated "representative" with
"advocate").
" See infra notes 69-89 and accompanying text (plain meaning analysis of
"representative").
47 See United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 121 (1978) (where
Congress did not "clearly manifest an intention to restrict" section, Court did not exclude
members at issue); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1988) (review of legislative history does not reveal congressional intent to exclude judges); Note, State Judicial
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judges under Section 2's scope exists in the Senate Report, where
Senator Orrin Hatch specifically testified as to such intended inclusion."' Moreover, at the Senate and House hearings, Congress
viewed statistics charting the growth in numbers of minority
judges elected since the passage of the VRA.4 The fact that no
member of Congress objected to Senator Hatch's testimony or to
the charts can be interpreted as an implied approval of including
judicial elections within the scope of Section 2.
Examination of the Senate Report also reveals that Congress
often used various terms descriptive of the judiciary interchangeably with "representative. "5 0 Such an inconsistent use of the word
"representative" further shows that Congress did not intend to
exclude judges from the reach of Section 2.5' The highly influenElections, supra note 2, at 798 (some courts reason that since judiciary not expressly excluded in legislative history, judiciary should not be excluded from Section 2).
Some courts have taken the opposite view and reasoned that because the legislative history does not explicitly include judges in Section 2, Congress intended to exclude judges.
See, e.g., LULAC, 914 F.2d at 630 (lack of legislative history supports plain meaning).
" See S. REP.No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 151, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMiN. NEws 177, 323. Senator Hatch stated, "It is important to emphasize [that] ...
'political subdivision' [in Section 21 encompasses all governmental units, including... judicial districts." Id. Significantly, there was no report of any senator having objected to this
statement. Id. See also Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir.) ("[W]e believe
the statement provides persuasive evidence of congressional understanding and believe that
Section 2 applies to the judiciary, especially since the Report is silent as to any dissent by
senators from Senator Hatch's description."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), ov-errled,
League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nown. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex.,
111 S.Ct. 775 (1991).
4
See Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S.53, S.1761, S.1976, S.1992 and H.R. 3112 Before the
Subcnm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 669,

748, 788-89 (1982) (statistics detailing increases in elected minority officials under VRA).
No senators protested such a review ofjudicial elections in considering the amendment. See
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir.) (congressional silence seen as persuasive evidence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
non. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S.Ct. 775 (1991).
" See, e.g., S.RE. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CoDE CONG. & ADmn. NEws, 177, 193 ("elected officials"); id. at 29, n. 115 (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws 177, 207 n.115 ("candidates"); id. at 30 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 177, 207 (same); id. at 67 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 246 (same).
51See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1988) (interchangeability of terms
shows "representatives" was not "narrowing term of art"); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d
1056, 1063 (5th Cir.) (Congress did not intentionally place "representatives" in Section 2
to exclude judges), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin
American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
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tial testimony of the United States Attorney General concerning
the VRA's enactment corroborates this conclusion.
Testifying before the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee prior to the VRA's enactment, the United States Attorney General asserted that Section 2 covered judicial elections."
He stated, "every election in which registered voters are permitted to vote would be covered" by the VRA. 5 Since the VRA expressly grants the Attorney General standing to bring claims
under Section 2 and to preclear new voting procedures under Section 5," the court should have considered his views highly authoritative. Instead, the court dismissed these factors and produced a
list of cases that accord with its conclusion." However, scrutiny of
White v. Regester," the case on which Congress modeled the
amended version of Section 2, proves the majority, and those
courts upon which the majority relied, wrong.
As the majority conceded, Congress took the amendment to
Section 2 almost verbatim from a passage in the earlier Supreme
Court case of White v. Regester8 7 In adopting the White Court's langranted sub nom Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991).
" See Voting Rights: Hearing Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the HouseJudiciaryCommittee, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965) (Attorney General's position of Section 2 and its applicability to
state judicial elections).
Since the passage of the Act in 1965, the United States Attorney General's office has
repeatedly found that Section 2 applies to judges. See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 652 Uohnson, J.,
dissenting).
" See Voting Rights: Hearing Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the HouseJudiciaryCommittee, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965) (position of United States Attorney General).
"See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 645 (Higginbotham. J., concurring) (discussing Section 5's
requirements).
" See id. at 629 n.9. These cases, however, are completely distinguishable, for as the
majority itself admitted, most were decided "in the context of... whether the one-man,
one vote rubric applied to judicial elections." Id. See also Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275,
277 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The one-man, one vote cases do not control cases brought under the
Voting Rights Act.").
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
67 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (use of "results" test in finding voting
process discriminatory). In White, it was set forth:
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation
by the group in question - that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect Lgistators
of their choice.
Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 5 (setting forth statutory language of Section 2(b) of
VRA, which enunciates standard to determine if violation of subdivision (a) "results" test
had occurred). See also S. REp. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprintedin 1982 US.
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guage, Congress changed "to elect legislators of their choice,"
Section 2's original wording, to "to elect representatives of their
choice."" The LULAC court, however, concluded that Congress
broadened the scope of "representatives" to include both legislators and executive officials, but that the change was not so all-encompassing as to include judges." However, it has been suggested
that it is more reasonable and logical to conclude that, since Congress chose an expansive term, "representatives," to replace "legislators" and did not explicitly exclude judges, it intended to include judges as "representatives. ''60
CODE CONG. & AomiN. NEWS 177, 205 ("subsection (b) embodies the test laid down in
White"); id. at 28, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmw. Nzws 177, 206 (main pur-

pose of amendment was to ease plaintiffs' burden of proof from establishing intent to discriminate to proving only discriminatory results).
" See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C § 1973b (1982). See also supra note 5 (setting
forth language of Section 2 of VRA).
" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 628-29. The majority concluded that the word "representatives" was broadened only so far as to include legislators and executive officials. Id. The
court suggested that Congress is presumed to know of the judicial construction of the term
"representatives" in general at the time of the amendment, and the court incorrectly cited
two cases which do not even discuss the VRA. Id. (citing Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
486 U.S. 174 (1988) (Supremacy Clause and nuclear power plant operator's entitlement to
worker's compensation); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1987) (Tort
Claims Act and malicious prosecution suit)).
In contravention of the LULAC court's conclusion, Congress is presumed to have known
of the judicial constructions of Section 2 at the time of the amendment. Cf. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River Assoc., 459 U.S. 297, 320 (1983) (Congress
presumed to be aware of previous judicial rulings under unamended Act); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (Congress presumed to be aware of judicial interpretation
of earlier laws); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 187 (1959)
(Congress presumed to be aware of earlier antitrust laws in passing new law prohibiting
railroad monopolies). At the time of the amendment to Section 2, no court had excluded
judges from Section 2 coverage. See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 652 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("No
previous court has ever even suggested that judicial elections might be exempt from the
reach of Section 2 of the VRA."); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siegelman,
714 F. Supp. 511, 514 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (every trial and appellate court which ruled on
issue found judges covered by Section 2). See also, e.g., Uvalde Consol. Indep. School Dist.
v. United States, 451 U.S. 1002 (1981) (at-large system discriminated against minorities);
McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1981) (black residents prevented
from electing black candidates to three governing bodies), cert. dismissed sub. nom. Pensacola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946 (1981); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (1978) (minorities unfairly discriminated against in municipal elections), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
" See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 279-280 (6th Cir. 1988). In Mallory, the Sixth
Circuit refused to accept a restrictive meaning of the word "representatives," explaining
that such treatment of the word is not at all consistent with the application-expanding purpose of the 1982 amendment. Id. "We can find no basis in the language or legislative
history of the 1982 amendment to support a holding that the use of the word 'representatives' was intended to remove judicial elections from the operations of the Act." Id. at 280.
In Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siegelman, an Alabama district court as-
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Examination of the VRA's purpose supports this latter argument. 1 As the majority conceded, the VRA is a remedial act.'
Thus, fundamental rules of statutory construction mandate that a
court interpret it broadly.1 An expansive reading advances the
serted that to conclude that Congress, in an attempt to expand application of the Act,
would utilize the term "representatives" once and, without explanation or clarification,
with a desire that it be construed restrictively, is absurd. See Southern Christian Leadership
Conference v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 517 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
Likewise, in Martin v. Allain, a Mississippi district court declared that the word "representatives" applies to "anyone selected or chosen by popular election from among a field of
candidates to fill an office, including judges." Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1200
(S.D. Miss. 1987) (emphasis added). The court concluded that a state must adhere to the
VRA in conducting judicial elections. Id. See also Note, State judicial Elections, supra note 2
passim (broad term indicates expansion, not constriction).
01 See infra note 98 (discussing VRA's purpose). Cf. Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 280
(6th Cir. 1988) (legislative history and congressional policy favor expansive reading);
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir.) (Act's purpose, to expand protection
from racial discrimination supports including judges in Section 2), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex. 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991); Note, State Judicial Elections, supra note 2, at
799 (since Act's purpose was to expand voters' rights and decrease discrimination, construing "representatives" broadly is most suitable).
As a general rule of statutory construction, the Supreme Court typically interprets statutes to advance the congressional purpose in enacting the statutes. See, e.g., Commissioner
v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (interpreting Internal Revenue Code, Court looked for
construction "most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested") (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)); Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S.
103, 118 (1982) (Court interpreted Gun Control Act "in light of the purposes Congress
sought to serve") (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608
(1979)).
- See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548 (1969) (Supreme Court policy
that VRA is remedial in nature); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)
("Act is a complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant"). Cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (Section
2 in particular advances guarantees of fifteenth amendment).
" See United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1978)
(Act's remedial goals and legislative history urge broad reading to effectuate Congress' purpose); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969) (Act so broad that "Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered
State in even a minor way") (emphasis added); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
315 (1966) (to fulfill congressional intent "to rid the country of racial discrimination," Act
must be broadly construed).
A traditional canon of statutory construction is that remedial statutes are to be liberally
construed. See, e.g., Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268
(1977) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act construed broadly to
remedy longshoreman's injuries); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64 (1968) (federal habeas
corpus statute is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed); Tcherepuin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (finding Securities Exchange Act to be remedial legislation, Court interpreted it broadly "to effectuate its purposes").
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Act's purpose of ending racial discrimination in voting procedures." Under such a broad interpretation of the term "representatives," state judicial elections must fall within the scope of
65
Section 2's coverage.
Unfortunately, the majority dismissed this important legislative
history and conflicting court interpretations." As a result, it is
submitted that the majority, in effect, engaged solely in a plain
meaning interpretation of the statute.67 However, even a plain
meaning interpretation should not have produced the majority's

conclusion."
B. "Plain Meaning" Interpretationof "Representative" UnderSection 2
A correct "plain meaning" interpretation of a statute would examine that statute as a whole." Consequently, the majority should
Even before the VRA was passed, the Supreme Court liberally granted the right to vote
and reinstated some aggrieved voters' claims which lower courts had refused to hear. See
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("history has seen a continuing expansion of
the scope of the right of suffrage in this country"); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,18
(1964) (challenges on constitutionality of Georgia's congressional districting statute held to
be justiciable question); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963) (upheld constitutional claim that state's county-unit system for primary was tantamount to election).
"See supra note 61 and infra notes 90-98 (discussing VRA's purpose).
See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying "representatives"
narrowly "is completely inconsistent with the purpose of the amendment to expand the
application of the Act"); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir.) (construing
"representatives" in broad, untraditional sense to further Act's purpose), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v.
Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S.Ct. 775 (1991); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 307
(M.D. La. 1988) (broad construction of "representatives" based on Constitution and VRA).
" See supra notes 41 & 47-65 and accompanying text (conflicting court interpretations
and VRA's legislative history, respectively).
0See JoNEs, KERNOCAN & MuRPHY, LEGAL ME-rHOD, 388, 389 (1980) (discussing "plain
meaning" interpretation); Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning" Rule and
Statuty Inutetation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 1299, 1301 (1975)

(even under plain meaning rule there are many ways in which court can look at legislative
history).
See infra notes 69-89 and accompanying text (plain meaning analysis of "representative").
See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975). The Supreme Court noted that
"in expounding a statute we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Id.
(quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849)). See also
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) ("We believe it fundamental that a section
of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act.").
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have considered the term "voting," contained in Section 2, as it is
defined in Section 14.70 Section 14 defines "voting" as the practices and procedures for the election of "candidates for public and
party office."171 Since elected state judges are clearly candidates

for public office, it follows that Section 2 must include the election
of state judges.
Furthermore, viewing a statute as a whole requires a court to
read its particular sections together. 72 Accordingly, since both
Sections 2 and 5 address voting procedures and practices,73 they
should be read and applied together. Section 2 sets forth the
voter's fundamental right to have an unfettered opportunity to
elect a minority official if the voter so chooses,'7 while Section 5
requires that any new or amended state voting procedure be
precleared by the United States Attorney General to prevent racial discrimination.75 Recently, in Georgia v. Brooks,7 the Supreme
Court confirmed that Section 5 applies to state judicial elections. 77
,* See id. See also Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 278 (6th Cir. 1988) (broad purpose
advanced by applying Section 14 definition to Section 2); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp.
285, 307 (M.D. La. 1988) (borrowing Section 14 definition expands Section 2's coverage to
state appellate judges). Cf. Note, State Judicial Electimu, supra note 2, at 805 (Section 14
argument is "plausible").
" Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 19 7 3(cXl) (1982). This section defines "voting" as "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any... election... [of] candidates
for public or party office ..... Id.
" See supra note 69 (must read statute in its entirety). Cf. United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (noting that "internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt
with").
" See Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 307 (M.D. La. 1988) (suggesting Sections 2
and 5 may be applied in tandem); Note, State Judicial Elections, supra note 2, at 804-05
(Section 5 analogized to Section 2). Cf. Mallory v. Eyrich. 839 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir.
1988) (identical language of both sections supports utilizing both Sections 2 and 5 to end
racial discrimination). But see Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. La. 1987)
(analogy flawed because Section 5 not restricted to elections of representatives), rev'd, 839
F.2d 1056, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin American
Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nora.
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991); Kirksey v. Allain,
635 F. Supp. 347, 349 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (Sections 2 and 5 do not work together to end
discrimination in judicial elections).
"See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 US.C. § 1973c (1982). Applicability of Section 5 is
not made controversial by the term "representatives," because such term is not in the provision. Id.
" 111 S. Ct. 288 (1990).
"See Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elections, 111 S. Ct. 288 (1990) (one-line affirmance of district court ruling that Section 5 applies to state judiciary). This ruling dispels the
controversy federal courts have had concerning the applicability of Section 5 to the state
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Therefore, since both of the sections are meant to effectuate the
VRA's goals, Section 2 should work with Section 5 to end racial
discrimination in judicial elections and should, analogously, be
made applicable to state judicial elections.
Such construction not only comports with statutory rules of
construction, but also furthers the VRA's remedial purpose and
avoids an anomalous result. As the concurrence noted, failure to
apply both Sections 2 and 5 to judicial elections would. lead to the
"incongruous result that if a jurisdiction had a discriminatory voting procedure in place with respect to judicial elections it could
not be challenged, but if the state sought to introduce that very
procedure as a change from existing procedures it would be subject to Section 5 preclearance and could not be implemented."'7 8
The Supreme Court's recent confirmation in Brooks that Section 5
does apply to judicial elections renders this argument even more
compelling.
In general, the majority's "plain meaning" interpretation is
flawed, for as the dissent insightfully noted, it seemingly equated
"representative" with "advocate." 8 0 Such a construction both violates the term's actual plain meaning 1 and legislative history,"
and leads to absurd results.8" First, as the dissent noted, not all
representatives are advocates." For example, many other elected
officials whom the majority would label "representatives," such as
a mayor or county sheriff, would grossly defy their office duties if
they performed in an advocatory manner. 85 Second, after equatjudiciary. See, e.g., Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410, 413 (D.N.C. 1985) (Section 5 applies
to state judicial elections), affd mem., 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
'
LULAC, 914 F.2d at 645 (Higginbotham, J. concurring).
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Brooks v. Georgia).
See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 654 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The majority concluded that
since a judge has no constituents, he does not act in a partisan matter, and therefore, is not
a representative. Id. at 628.
See supra notes 69-79 and infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text (plain meaning
analysis of "representative"). See also LULAC, 914 F.2d at 638 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) ("The plain language of Section 2 reaches judicial elections.").
" See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text (discussing VRA's legislative history).
- See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (absurd results explained). See also United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (noting "requirement that reviewing court avoid
statutory interpretations that lead to an absurd result").
" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 654 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
" See id.
0'
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ing "representative" with "advocate," the majority wrongfully
concluded that, since judges are not advocates but merely impartial interpreters of the law, there is no need to apply Section 2.86
While it is true that judges must act impartially in performing
their jobs, the majority simplistically implied that there is no
choice to make in judicial elections.8 7 The very existence of an
election, however, manifests that there is a choice to make, and
shows the fallaciousness of the majority's reasoning. Texas itself
recognizes this choice by holding judicial elections to begin with.
Otherwise, Texas simply could appoint candidate judges randomly. The truth of the matter is that different judges, though
impartial, interpret laws differently. Moreover, the process of interpreting laws and deciding disputes often presents judges with
the opportunity to reject or consider varying policy considerations. Hence, even amongst impartial interpreters of the law,
there isa choice to make.
Thus, a proper examination of the plain meaning of the term
"representative" would not confine this broad term to the narrow
definition set forth by the majority. It is submitted that "representative" is a broad term which can include any elected government
office not explicitly excluded," which necessarily includes members of the judiciary.
III. APPLYING SECTION 2: DISSENT V. CONCURRENCE

While the concurrence agreed that judges are representatives
under Section 2, and thus that Section 2 covers judicial elections
in general, it nonetheless held that, due to the VRA's purpose and
the nature of a trial judge's office, Section 2 does not cover elections for trial judges in particular.8 ' It is suggested that close examination of the concurrence's reasoning supports the dissent's
observations and reveals that the concurrence's reasoning con" See id. at 628.

s1See id. at 625-27, 628 (judges have no constituents, as they "speak the voice of law,
and in doing so they speak for and to the entire community, never for segments of it and
still less for particular individuals").
" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 656 ("representative" for VRA's purposes "may be defined as
anone selected by popular election from a field of candidates to fill an office").
80 See id. at 645-46 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
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cerning the applicability of Section 2 rests on false premises. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from these premises are equally
faulty in nature. Accordingly, it is submitted that, like that of the
majority, the concurrence's reasoning on this matter should be rejected, as Section 2 must apply to judicial elections.
A.

False Premises
1.

The Purpose of the Voting Rights Act

In accord with the dissent," it is submitted that the concurrence simply misapprehended the VRA's true aim. As the dissent
noted, the VRA's purpose was not to guarantee minorities the
right to "have their interests represented in governmental decisions," as was asserted by the concurrence.' Neither the VRA's
plain language" 2 nor its legislative history" manifests this as its
purpose. Furthermore, as the dissent noted, assuming this to be
the VRA's true purpose would "lead to the absurd conclusion that
a plaintiff could, pursuant to the Voting Rights Act, bring to task
an elected official who has not, during his tenure in office, given
proper deference to minority interests."" Hence, the concur" See id. at 658 Uohnson, J., dissenting).
91 Id. See Solomon v. Liberty County, 865 F.2d 1566, 1583 ("goal of Section 2 is not to
maximize the political clout of minorities but rather to ensure minority representation in
government"), vacated, 873 F.2d 248 (11 th Cir. 1989). One commentator has illustrated
the VRA's applicability by "[c]onsider[ing] an elected sheriff who makes a number of decisions that harm minority interests." Note, Applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Single
Member Offices, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 2199, 2246 (1990) [hereinafter "Note, Applying Section 2"].
"[W]hile sheriffs acts are discriminatory, the [VRA] does not apply because the [decisionmaking] conduct does not interfere with opportunities to participate in the political process." Id.
" See infra note 5 (setting forth relevant language of VRA).
" See S. Rzp. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 179 (inquiry of Section 2's "results" test is whether "political processes are equally
open to minority voters"); 11 CONG. REc. 8295 (1965). This Senate Report manifests that
the Voting Rights Act's purpose or aim was "not only to correct an active history of discrimination, the denying of Negroes of the right to register and vote, but also to deal with
the accumulation of discrimination." Id. See also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140
(1976). In Beer, the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe legislative history reveals that the
basic purpose of Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act was 'to rid the country of
racial discrimination in voting.' " Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
315 (1966)).
" LULAC, 914 F.2d at 658, n.13. Cf. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 (1981).
"The deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled rests
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rence's belief as to the VRA's purpose is completely unfounded.
Moreover, it is submitted that, in a majoritarian democracy, no
law as basic as the VRA could possibly guarantee that minorities
would "have their interests represented in governmental decisions.""6 In a majoritarian democracy, the principle that "majority
rules," almost by definition, results in the majority rejecting the
minority's influence." Hence, a law such as the VRA, which
upon the principle that the political process of our majoritarian democracy responds to the
wishes of the people." Id.
" LULAC, 914 F.2d at 651 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). See Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.
Supp. 196, 233 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (Eisele, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "[I]n
one sense, it can be stated that majoritarian democracy always discriminates against political minorities." Id. "[Cjourts may not constitutionally prohibit, or do away with
majoritarian democracy as a remedy for violations of Section 2." Id. at 259. See also A.
LijPHART, DEMOCRAaES 4 (1984). Professor Lijphart posited that, "[the essence of the
[majoritarian] model [of democracy] is majority rule." Id. See generally B.ACx's LAw DicTIONARY 955 (6th ed. 1990). "Majority rule" is defined as "[rlule by the choice of the
majority of those who actually vote. . ." and "majority" is defined as the number greater
than half of any total. Id.
In Texas, to win a seat for most public offices, a candidate must simply receive more
votes than any other candidate. See Tvx. ELxc. CODE ANN. §2.001 (Vernon 1986). Some
other offices, however, require a candidate to win a majority of the votes cast, in which case
a run-off election is held between the two top vote receivers when no candidate receives a
majority. See Tix. ELEC. CODE ANN. §2.021 (Vernon 1986). Furthermore, passing a law in
Texas simply requires a majority of those present in the legislative quorum to vote for it.
See Txx. CoNsr. art. III. See also LULAC, 914 F.2d at 631 (majority characterizing our nation's political system as "majoritarian political game"). Hence, in light of these definitions
and interpretations, it is fair to conclude that Texas is a "majoritarian democracy."
" See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937). In this highly
renowned footnote, Justice Stone recognized the realities of majoritarian democracies,
questioning "whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" should be subject to
greater judicial scrutiny. Id. More specifically, he implied that "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily . . .relied upon to protect minorities," thus
requiring greater judicial scrutiny. Id.; J.ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DMrausT: A THaoRY OF JuDcAL REvxw 75-87 (1980). Relying on Carotene Products' famous footnote four, Professor
Ely challenged the "majority rule" concept, authorizing courts to interfere with defective
legislative processes which wrongfully deny a group sufficient representation in that process. Id. See also Note, Choosing Ilepresentatives by Lottey Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1284
(1984). Noting the application of Carolene Products' footnote four "to remedy the structural imperfections of the legislative marketplace," the author asserted that:
Unfortunately, judges cannot vindicate minority rights simply by protecting the
right to vote. Policing against malapportionment and franchise restrictions is insufficient because those with the most votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the expense of the others, or otherwise refuse to take their interests into
account.

Id. The author further stated that, "[plart of the appeal of the majority-rule principle lies
in its guarantee that, on any given issue, there will be more winners than losers," but, "[i]f
certain groups almost always find themselves on the losing end of important votes, then
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merely guarantees minorities the opportunity to elect their fair
share of governmental representatives, could not possibly guarantee that those representatives would actually "influence governmental decisions.'

7

Thus, while minority representation may, di-

rectly or indirectly, result in governmental influence, the VRA
does not secure such influence. Rather, as the dissent noted, the
VRA is simply aimed at granting minorities equal access to the
electoral process.' 8
majoritarianism may mask a tyranny that consistently rewards some citizens by oppressing
others." Id. at 1284 n.4. Lastly, he contended that "the reality of [Reynolds v. Sims] is that
when representatives are selected by majority rule, the votes of those in the minority do not
truly count." Id. at 1290. Accord Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority PoliticalParticipation
and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Ac, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 485 (1988) ("minority neglecting aspects of majoritarian democracy"); Selznick, The Idea of a CommunitarianMorality, 75
CALw. L. Rzv. 445, 456 (1987) ("impoverished and powerless minority lives side by side
with an affluent majority that has the votes and therefore the power to do as it pleases.").
One scholar has noted that, "the majoritarian interpretation of the basic definition of democracy is that it means "government by the majority of the people ...[but] majority rule
and the government-versus-opposition pattern of government that it implies may be interpreted as undemocratic because they are principles of exclusion." LIJPHART, supra note 95,
at 21. See also Note, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular
Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAuw.L. Rzv. 1473, 1502 n.196 (1987). The author noted that, "the electoral process can produce results that infringe the interests of
groups which are not well represented in the political process," and that, "a legislative
body will often serve the interests of the narrow electorate even at the expense of the
constitutional rights of others." Id. In short, "[p]ure democracies are inherently unstable
and permit the majority interest to oppress minorities." THE FEDmtALLsr No. 10, at 59-60

(J. Madison). Cf. THE FEDEaAsr No. 10, No. 51 (A. Hamilton) (Hamilton wary of legislative tyranny of majority). See generally supra note 95 (setting forth definition and general
discussion of concept of "majority rule").
9 LULAC, 914 F.2d at 651 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). See Abrams, supra note 96,
at 501 ("The presence of minority officials and the formal opportunity for interaction appear to be necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for minority influence in political decision-making.") But see Howard & Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act - Recognizing
the Emetging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLum. L. Rxv. 1615, 1631 n.61 (1983)
("[l]ncreased minority participation in the legislative process will increase legislative responsiveness to minority interests, thus yielding legislation that more accurately reflects the
interests of the society as a whole.").
" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 658 Uohnson, J., dissenting). See also Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 44 n.9 (1986). The Court observed that, "lals the Senate Report notes, the
purpose of the Voting Rights Act was 'not only to correct an active history of discrimination, the denying to Negroes of the right to register and vote, but also to deal with the
accumulation of discrimination.'" Id. (quoting 111 CONG. Rxc 8295 (1965)); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 546 (1980) (VRA addressed problem of discriminatory denial of
access to electoral process); United States v. Mississippi, 444 U.S. 1050, 1051 (1980) (under
VRA, court should determine only whether there has been abridgement or denial of right
to vote on account of race or color); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S.
32, 50 n.4 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the purpose of the Voting Rights
Act was to 'banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting' in selected States." (quoting
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2.

Single-Member Offices

Consistent with the dissent, it is submitted that the second premise underlying the concurrence's reasoning, that Texas district
judges hold "single-member" offices, is also erroneous."a The dissent first objected to this premise on the grounds that "[n]othing
in the language of Section 2 suggests that a reviewing court
should concentrate on the type of election [office] under dispute."1 0 0 However, notwithstanding the propriety of such a focus,
it is further submitted, as the dissent itself then observed, that the
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 315 (1966) ("The Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to rid
the country of racial discrimination in voting."); Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232,
1237 (4th Cir. 1989) (VRA's purpose is one "of securing equal opportunity for minorities
to elect the representatives of their choice"); McCord v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 787 F.2d
1528, 1536, vacated, 804 F.2d 611 (11th Cir. 1986). Judge Swygert noted in dissent that
"[tihere is no question that the underlying purpose of the 1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments is to insure that 'political processes are equally open to minority voters.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 179).
" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 647-48 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). A single-member office has been defined as "a situation where under no circumstances will there ever be more
than one such position in a particular geographic voting area." Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 518 (M.D. Ala. 1989). The concurrence
in LULAC acknowledged this definition, yet nonetheless rejected it:
The [Siqelman] court found that exclusive authority alone does not define singlemember official. We disagree with this view of multi-member versus single-member
office and agree with the argument made by defendants in Siegelman that "the hallmark of a single-member office ... is not the fact that the office is traditionally held
by only one individual but, more importantly, the fact that the full authority of that
office is exercised exclusively by one individual."
LULAC, 920 F.2d at 648 (quoting Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. at 518). By adopting the Siegelman defendant's definition, the concurrence introduced a complicated definition which ignored the term's true and simple meaning and which the Siegelman court itself rejected,
noting that "[tihe defendants [presenting this definition] offer no rationale for their alternative definition ...." Id. Secondly, the Siegelman court reiterated that "the true hallmark
of a single-member office is that only one position is being filled for an entire geographic
area, and the jurisdiction can be divided no smaller .... [W]hat is important is how many
positions there are in the voting jurisdiction." Id.
100 LULAC, 914 F.2d at 657 Uohnson, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson contended that:
Despite Congress' clear statement that the Voting Rights Act applies to all voting,
the concurrence, through rhetoric surrounding the term "representative," attempts
to shift attention from the one casting a vote to the one for whom the vote is cast.
Not one word or thought contained in Section 2(a) or (b) supports, or is suggested
by the concurrence in support, of this effort . . . . Nothing in the language of
Section 2 suggests that a reviewing court should concentrate on the type of election
under dispute- whether it is for a mayor, an alderman, a legislator, a constable, a
judge or any other kind of elected official.
Id.
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concurrence misunderstood what the term "single-member office"
really signifies. 101
Relying on Butts v. City of New York, 10 ' the concurrence seemingly concluded that, because a district judge is not a member of a
multi-member decision-making body, he holds a single-member
office.1 08 However, as the dissent perceptively noted, the conclusion that judges do not belong to a multi-member decision-making
body, but instead decide cases alone, does not warrant the conclusion that they hold single-member offices. 1 0
While acknowledging that there are many judges with overlapping jurisdictions, the concurrence nonetheless insisted that
judges hold single-member offices because there is "no overlap101 See id. at 657 Uohnson, J., dissenting). Cf. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States,
479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987) (VRA given "broadest possible scope.") (quoting Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
'- 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). In Butts, the plaintiffs, representing a group of minority voters living in New York City, challenged a New
York statute which required a run-off election for three city offices, including the mayoral
office. Id. at 143. The court held that, where no party candidate receives greater than 40%
of the vote, a run-off requirement for a single-member-office does not deny any class an
opportunity of equal representation, and therefore does not violate the VRA. Id. at 149.
I"BSee LULAC, 914 F.2d at 647-48 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). The concurrence
stated that "viewing judges as members of a. multi-member body is flawed in concept,"
because "once a case is assigned, it is decided by only one judge." Id. at 649. After describing judicial offices as those "filled by one person," it contrasted such an office with a multimember body and concluded that the judicial office was a single-member office. Id. The
concurrence noted the judges' "character as single-office holders instead of members of a
multi-member body." Id.
'" See id. at 661 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson posited that "[w]hether an office-holder wields his power in an individual or collegial manner is simply not the relevant
inquiry." Id. at 662. Furthermore, he insightfully noted:
In its broadest sense, the concurrence's conception of the "single officeholder exception" states absolutely nothing. Every officeholder is a single officeholder; no position
is shared by more than one person. Every officeholder exercises complete authority
over the duties of his or her office. To say that a district judge in Texas exercises
full responsibility over his office simply does not advance the analysis. Every state
legislator exercises full responsibility over his or her office; in that respect the legislator is no different from a judge. Every county sheriff exercises full responsibility
over his or her office; in that respect the county sheriff is no different from a judge.
Id. at 661. Accordingly, Judge Johnson noted that, "[t]he question [under the single officeholder analysis] is not whether a judge can be subdivided. . . . but rather whether the
judiciary can be subdivided .. " Id. Hence, under the single-member office exception, the
inquiry is not whether a particular officeholder exercises full responsibility over his or her
office, but whether, in a given district, there is more than one person holding such an
office. See Note, Applying Section 2, supra note 91, at 2200 (in single-member office,
"greater power is concentrated in one individual and no comparable office exists in the
jurisdiction"); supra note 99 (definition of single-member office).
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ping in decision-making." 1'0 Yet, the type of decision-making implicit to an office does not determine its characterization as singlemember, but is merely a result of that status.'" As the dissent
suggested, decision-making was not at issue in Butts, as "Butts
stands for nothing more than the unremarkable proposition that
in certain electoral situations, there exists only one relevant office
for the whole electorate.'1 0 7 The challenged counties, however,
each contain more than one judge."" As such, a conclusion that
the concurrence misunderstood Butts' rationale is warranted.,,"
Contrary to the concurrence's viewpoint, it is additionally sub1,5
LULAC, 914 F.2d at 648 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). See supra note 99 (detailing
concurring opinion's discussion of members of judiciary as single-member office holders).
.See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 661 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The fact that their is no overlap
in decision-making is not the quality which renders an office "single-member," but it is
instead submitted that exclusive decision-making is simply a consequence of an office being
"'single-member." This reality is clear when viewed in light of Judge Johnson's observation
that "[elvery officeholder exercises complete authority over the duties of his or her office."
Id. See also Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 518
(M.D. Ala. 1989). The defendants in Siegeman were similarly confused as to the real definition of a single-member office. Id. The Siegelman court thus observed:
The defendants' confusion as to the true implications of the concept of single-member offices possibly arises from the fact that, in most cases, any officeholder who
wields his authority independently will coincidentally also be the only holder of his
position in the entire geographic area. For example, it is unheard of to have more
than one governor for the same state, or more than one mayor for the same city;
coincidentally, these are also positions where the full authority is exercised exclusively by one individual. Examination of Butts ...and the instant case demonstrates
that these two characteristics do not always co-exist, and that when they do,they do
so only by coincidence. Accordingly, this court is of the opinion that the defendants
are incorrect when they extrapolate the latter characteristic from the former as a
prerequisite for Section 2 applicability.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Iff LULAC, 914 F.2d at 661 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson concluded that,
"[in effect, the at-large boundaries [in Butts] coincide with the only "district" boundaries
possible; because there is only one position to be filled, it becomes impossible to split up the
jurisdiction any smaller." Id. at 662 (citing SiegeLman, 714 F. Supp. at 519-20 (footnotes
omitted)). See also supra note 102 and infra note 109 (discussing Butts decision).
I" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 651 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) ("this suit attacks only
the nine counties with multiple district judges"). See also infra note 109 (election within
discrete geographic areas of as many as fifty-nine judges).
I" See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 662 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
The Buns exception is premised simply on the number of officials being elected
(one), the unique responsibilities of that office, and the impediment to subdividing
that single position so that minority voters have the opportunity to elect a "share."
In the instant case, however, this Court is not concerned with the election of one
single member position; rather, this Court is concerned with the election within discrete geographic areas, of as many as fifty-nine judges with virtually identical
functions.
Id. But see id. at 647-50 (Higginbotham, J.. concurring) (interpreting Butts).

Journal of Legal Commentary

Vol. 6: 65, 1990

mitted that one can view Texas district judges as members of a
multi-member decision-making body. 1 The concurrence itself acknowledged certain instances where district judges often do act in
concert and do share duties."' Moreover, while judges might not
influence each other as directly as legislators might influence each
other during debate, judges do necessarily influence each other
through stare decisis and judicial comity.""
B.

Illogical and False Inferences

Even ignoring the false premises relied on by the concurrence,
critical examination reveals that the conclusions reached do not
logically follow, and are simply erroneous.
1.

The Purpose of the Voting Rights Act

Assuming, arguendo, that Section 2's purpose was to secure minority influence in governmental decision-making, this premise
does not permit the inference that Section 2 does not apply to
judicial elections. Analogously, one could argue that Section 2
does not apply to any elections, since, as previously noted,
majoritarian democracies often nullify minority representatives'
ability to influence government decisions." 3 Clearly, both the underlying argument and the underlying analogy are fallacious at
best, as both effectively dismantle Section 2. Secondly, the concurrence's suggestion that at-large elections behoove the minority
population by enabling it to vote for, and thereby influence, all of
LULAC, 914 F.2d at 648 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
See id. at 647. Judge Higginbotham noted that, under Texas' Special Practice Act,
"cases can be freely transferred between judges and that any judge can work on any part of
'

"

a case including preliminary matters." Id. In addition he noted that "the local administrative judge is elected by a majority vote of all the judges in the county ...." Id. The dissent
agreed, noting that "the concurrence's conclusion (that only one individual exercises the
full authority of a trial judge's office] is at odds with the true structure" of Texas' judicial
system. Id. at 662 n.19. In this light, it is fair to conclude that district judges in Texas do
sometimes share responsibilities and act as a collegial body.
11 See infra notes 115-16 (definition and significance of doctrines of stare decisis and
judicial comity, both of which provide very significant means by which judges influence
each other, even when deciding cases alone).
"l See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (minority often left powerless in majoritarian democracy). See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48 (1986) (discussing majority's ability to affect outcome of elections).
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the judges in a district""' also does not justify excluding Section 2.
This argument could similarly be made about legislative elections:
in a majoritarian democracy, it is much better to vote for, and
thereby have influence over, all legislators rather than to elect a
few representatives whose ideas the majority will inevitably disregard anyway. Since this scenario so clearly repugns the VRA altogether, such reasoning begs rejection.
Most significantly, it is simply untrue that the plaintiffs in LULAC had nothing to gain through the application of Section 2.
The concurrence's conclusion that minority populations in general have nothing to gain grossly ignores the great impact that
even one minority-elected judge can have through the legal doctrines of stare decisis"'1 and judicial comity."" Moreover, in this
124 See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 649 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Judge Higginbotham
noted that subdistricting, "may well lessen the minority influence instead of increase it
t,for] the current system of electing state judges at least permits voters to vote for each and
every judicial position within a given district .
I..."
Id. Hence, "[ilt is more likely, therefore, that minority voters will have some influence on the election of each judge." Id.
Thus, he concluded that "electing judges from single member districts only increases the
likelihood that a small number of governmental decisions will be influenced by minority
interests, while minority interests will not be represented at all in the majority of judicial
decisions." Id. at 651.
I' See generally BLAcK's LAW DICTrONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). "Stare decisis" is defined:
"to abide by, or adhere to, decided... cases." Id. Black's also defines stare decisis as the
"[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." Id. (citing Neff
v. George, 4 N.E.2d 388, 390-91 (III. 1936)). Black's also describes it as the "[d]octrine
that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same ....
" Id. (citing Home v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex.Civ. App.
1940)). Thus, any Texas judge interpreting the law greatly influences governmental decision-making, since the doctrine of stare decisis requires fellow judges within Texas to follow his/her interpretation of the law, such that one judge can create a precedent which all
other judges in Texas must follow. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 419 U.S. 164,
171 (1989). In Pafterson, the Supreme Court held that, "it is indisputable that stare decisis
is a basic self governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the
sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not
based upon 'an arbitrary discretion.'" Id. (quoting THE FwsxuAUs'r No. 78, at 490 (A.
Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1988)). See also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Public
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) ("[sltare decisis is of fundamental importance to the
rule of law").
" See generally Bt.AcK's LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). "Judicial comity" is defined
as "the principle in accordance with which the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give
effect to the laws and judicial decision of another ...." Id.
Moreover, aside from the great impact a single judge can have through stare decisis and
judicial comity, the dissent also noted that a single minority judge can serve as a role model
for minority group members, encouraging minority voting and election participation. LULAC, 914 F.2d at 659 n.14 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Conversely, "[p]ersistent minority de-
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light, it is asserted that one judge is much more valuable to a minority segment than any single legislator in a majoritarian democracy could ever be. In fact, courts have long been regarded precisely as protectors of the minority from the "tyranny of the
majority.1 11 7 Accordingly, if Section 2's applicability depends
upon what the minority population has to gain, as the concurrence implies, it could clearly be argued that, if anything, Section
2 is much more appropriately applied to judicial elections than to
legislative elections. 16
Finally, the concurrence stated that its decision respected
Texas' desire for coterminous jurisdictional and electoral bases, so
as to ensure accountability of the judiciary.'" It manifested a concern that "[slubdistricting would result in decisions being made
for the county as a whole by judges representing only a small fraction of the electorate," contrasting the situation with members of
larger bodies elected from subdistricts, where "the interests of all
the electors are still represented in each decision. ' s As previously noted, it is not always the case that all electors' interests are
represented in each decision.12 As such, it is submitted that, once
feat... leads to apathy among minority voters and a feeling of exclusion from the opportunity to join in the political process of self-government." Id.
1 THEx FEDERALT No. 10, No. 51 (A. Hamilton). See San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (concern expressed for "those relegated to such a
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process"); Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 962
n. 116 (1987) (justice Stone, in his famous Carotene Products footnote, advocated Court's
evaluating interests when legislative process could not be trusted); Bloch, John Marshall's
Selective Use of Histo, in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wis. L. Rzv. 301, 336 (1986) ("(tjhe

judicial branch remained the only hope of the Federalists to contain the dangers of
majoritarian democracy"); supra note 96 (Supreme Court, in CaroteneProducts' footnote,
expressed concern for political power of "discrete and insular minorities").
11 See supra note 117 (courts long regarded as minorities' protectors).
"'
See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 650 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
"Id.

See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (minority often without influence in
majoritarian democracy). The dissent asserted that judges presiding over persons not members of their jurisdiction is nothing new in Texas. Judge Johnson noted:
Under the existing system, it is highly probable that a case will be heard outside the
county in which a litigant lives. In such a case, at least one - and probably both of the parties will be appearing before a judge who was elected by a population
which does not include that litigant .... [Texas venue rules] frequently require that
an out-of-county resident appear before a judge for whom the litigant neither cast a
vote for nor against ....

Aside from the complexities of the Texas venue rules,

there are many other occasions when a party may appear before a judge elected by
the residents of another county. For example, district court judges are frequently
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again, the concurrence has overlooked the political realities of
majoritarian democracies and failed to consistently apply its
reasoning.
2.

Single-Member Offices

Even assuming that Texas district judges are "single-member
office" holders, this characterization should not have compelled
the majority to conclude that Section 2 does not apply. By analogy, "traditional members" of the state's executive branch, such
as mayors, are themselves true single-member office holders, and
yet even the majority admits that Section 2 applies to executive
elections. 1 22 Thus, it is submitted that characterization of an office
as "single-member" does not alone control the applicability of
Section 2.
CONCLUSION

In LULAC, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit narrowly
construed Section 2 and entirely disregarded the VRA's true purpose. Congress enacted the VRA to guarantee minorities equal access to the electoral process. By denying the plaintiffs the right to
challenge the election of Texas district judges, the court excluded
a significant governmental body from the VRA's coverage. As a
result, LULAC improvidently perpetuates minority discrimination

by denying minority segments of our society equal access to the
political process of state judiciaries.
Eileen Campbell & Robert R. Viducich

called into other counties to help with docket control .... Additionally, Texas authorizes the use of retired or senior state district judges, who wield all the powers of
their elected and active peers.
Id. at 668.
11 See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 622. The majority stated that Section 2 "'extends ... no
further than the legislative and executive branches ... " Id. See Note, Applying Section 2,
supra note 91, at 2213-15 (neither Congress nor Supreme Court mandated exemption of
single-member offices from Section 2's coverage).

